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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4-
103(2)(e). 
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. 
Edgar, District Court Case No. 131403487, on June 24, 2015. (Add. A, R. 354-56.) 
vJ Appellant Michael Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal on July 23, 2015. (R. 357-
58.) 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue: Was Mr. Edgar's counsel ineffective when he (1) did not object to 
testimony about Mr. Edgar's association with drug dealers; (2) did not object to 
the prosecutor's statement in closing argument that misstated the evidence and 
that was inflammatory; and (3) did not object to the admission of Mr. Edgar's 
statements that were made during the course of plea negotiations? 
Standard of Review: 11 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for 
41 the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for 
correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. But an II exception to the 
preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in 
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kozlov, 2012 
UT App 114, ,r 35, 276 P.3d 1207. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Determinative Provisions 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 410(a): 
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not 
admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the 
plea discussions: 
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn; 
(2) a nolo contendere plea; 
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or 
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they 
resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
By Information, the State charged Mr. Edgar with two counts of possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, two counts of possession or use 
of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 
>d) 1-2.) In that same Information, the State also charged Heather Marsh with 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 2.) 
The State later amended the Information to exclude Heather Marsh and to add the 
allegation that some of the conduct occurred within a drug-free zone. (R. 31-33.) 
After a trial, the jury found Mr. Edgar guilty on all counts but determined 
that none of the conduct occurred in a drug-free zone. (R. 324-28.) The district 
court sentenced Mr. Edgar. (R. 354-56.) Mr. Edgar now appeals. 
2. Statement of Facts 
In November 2013, the police were conducting surveillance at a house 
VI) where Mr. Edgar, Mr. Edgar's wife,1 and Heather Marsh resided. (R. 451-52.) The 
police saw a vehicle leave the house and followed it. (R. 452-53.) The vehicle made 
a stop at a convenience store, and shortly after the vehicle left the store, the police 
stopped it. (R. 453-56.) When the police pulled over the vehicle, they found Ms. 
1 Mr. Edgar has been in a common-law relationship with a woman for several 
years. (R. 336.) The woman identified herself as Mr. Edgar's wife. (R. 457.) 
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Marsh and Mr. Edgar's wife in the car. (R. 456-57.) The officer that testified at trial 
never saw Mr. Edgar get into the vehicle and never saw Mr. Edgar at the 
convenience store. (R. 526.) 
The police brought a drug-sniffing dog to the vehicle, and the dog alerted 
to the presence of drugs within the vehicle. (R. 458.) Based on the alert, the police 
searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on Ms. 
Marsh. (R. 458.) The police also found a safe in the trunk. (R. 459-60.) 
The police found Mr. Edgar at his home and arrested him, brought him to 
the vehicle, and told him about the safe. (R. 465-66.) Mr. Edgar refused to divulge 
the combination to the safe for fear that it might implicate him. (R. 466.) The police 
obtained a search warrant for the safe and found methamphetamine, alprazolam, 
oxycodone,2 and drug paraphernalia inside. (R. 466, 471, 472, 475.) The police then 
executed a search warrant at Mr. Edgar's home and found marijuana in his 
bedroom. (R. 488, 494.) 
At Mr. Edgar's trial, three key witnesses testified: Ms. Marsh (who originally 
was Mr. Edgar's co-defendant), a detective, and an agent from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. 
2 The oxycodone pills were found inside a prescription bottle with a label on 
it identifying Mr. Edgar and showing that the prescription was filled on August 
26, 2013. (R. 476-77.) The police, however, believed that the label on the 
prescription bottle was changed. (R. 476.) 
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Ms. Marsh testified that Mr. Edgar was in the vehicle when the vehicle left 
the house and that she and Mr. Edgar's wife dropped him off at a city building. 
(R. 558, 560.) She also testified that Mr. Edgar put the safe in the vehicle, kept drugs 
in the safe, and had opened the safe several times. (R. 565.) She also admitted that 
she had drug paraphernalia in the safe and that she could not exactly remember 
viJ parts of what happened the night Mr. Edgar was arrested because she had "done 
quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.) 
The detective testified about an exchange he had with Mr. Edgar. The 
detective stated, "[Mr. Edgar] indicated that he knew several-and his words were 
big players of people that carry weight which would mean people who distribute 
in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely methamphetamine is what we were 
speaking about, that he could provide those people in exchange for leniency on 
these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.) 
Finally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent testified about 
v;; a conversation he had with Mr. Edgar. According to the agent, Mr. Edgar said 
"that he had access to a Mexican source of supply for heroin and that individual 
was capable or, or that he was capable of getting pounds from that, from that 
target." (Add. C, R. 593.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did not object to the testimony of 
the detective or the agent. 
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Near the end of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, 
"Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges with the Major Crimes 
Task Force, the DEA, how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA 
and say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work, I'm moving tons of 
weight, pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672-73.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did not object 
to this statement. (Id.) And after the prosecutor finished his rebuttal, the jury 
retired for deliberations without any further instructions from the district court. 
(Add. D, R. 675.) 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective in three ways. 
First, trial counsel did not object to testimony from the detective or the DEA 
agent that associated Mr. Edgar with drug dealers. This testimony should have 
been excluded under Utah R. Evid. 403 as more prejudicial than probative. 
Second, trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing statement that 
referred to Mr. Edgar as "a drug dealer admittedly" who was "moving tons of 
weight, pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672-73.) This statement was inflammatory. 
Moreover, Mr. Edgar never admitted to being a drug dealer, and no evidence 
supported the assertion that Mr. Edgar was moving pounds of heroin. 
In both instances, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced. The testimony and the 
prosecutor's inaccurate statement cast Mr. Edgar as a notorious drug dealer who 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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associated with other drug dealers and encouraged the jury to convict Mr. Edgar 
regardless of the evidence presented at trial. 
Third, Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion concurrent with this 
brief asserting that his counsel was ineffective when he did not object under Utah 
R. Evid. 410 to the admission of Mr. Edgar's statements that were made during the 
~ course of plea negotiations. 
Argument 
1. Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective 
Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the 
admission of evidence and when he failed to object to the prosecutor's 
misstatements during closing argument. 
For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Edgar must satisfy the 
Strickland3 standard, which requires him to prove "(1) that counsel's performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
"wP (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 
70, ,r 18, 321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving that his counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness requires [the 
defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the 
3 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 
1, ,r 34, 247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). Sound trial strategy does not require 
trial counsel to lodge an objection that would be futile. State v. King, 2010 UT App 
396, ,r 33, 248 P.3d 984. 
1.1 Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
testimony about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers. 
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Mr. Edgar 
knew drug dealers as too prejudicial. 
During trial, a detective testified, "[Mr. Edgar] indicated that he knew 
several- and his words were big players of people that carry weight which would 
mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely 
methamphetamine is what we were speaking about, that he could provide those 
people in exchange for leniency on these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.) And a DEA 
agent testified that Mr. Edgar informed him "that he had access to a Mexican 
source of supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that he was 
capable of getting pounds from that, from that target." (Add. C, R. 593.) For ease, 
the testimony of the detective and the agent quoted above will be cumulatively 
referred to as the "Challenged Testimony." Mr. Edgar's counsel did not object to 
the Challenged Testimony. (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593.) 
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Mr. Edgar's counsel was deficient for not objecting to the Challenged Testimony. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Here, the minimal 
evidentiary value of the Challenged Testimony was significantly outweighed by 
the prejudicial nature of that testimony. 
The probative value of the Challenged Testimony was low. Courts gauge 
the probative value of testimony by, among other things, "its ability to make the 
existence of a consequential fact either more or less probable." Robinson v. Taylor, 
2015 UT 69, ,r 28, 356 P.3d 1230 (quotation omitted). Here, the Challenged 
Testimony shed no light on what happened when the police arrested Mr. Edgar. 
Specifically, the Challenged Testimony did not aid the jury in determining crucial 
facts in this case, such as whether Mr. Edgar put the safe in the car, whether Mr. 
Edgar had control over the safe, whether the drugs in the safe were Mr. Edgar's, 
or whether Mr. Edgar intended to distribute the drugs. Nor was there any other 
..:J) connection between the drug dealers and Mr. Edgar and the charged crimes. See 
United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) ( excluding evidence 
of defendant's sons' drug convictions because there was no evidence that sons 
were involved in charged crime); United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285,289 (5th Cir. 
1982) (reasoning that defendant's contact with individuals who had convictions 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for drug-related offenses was irrelevant to whether defendant was engaged in a 
drug conspiracy). 
Here, all the Challenged Testimony proved was that Mr. Edgar knew drug 
dealers. That's it. No evidence-not even a hint of an allegation-existed that the 
drug dealers were connected with the charged crimes. The jury realizing that Mr. 
Edgar knew some drug dealers was utterly unhelpful in determining whether Mr. 
Edgar possessed drugs on the night he was arrested. 
But what the Challenged Testimony did do was raise an impermissible 
inference that because Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer. 
See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006) (reasoning 
that "guilt by association" evidence is "irrelevant to the question of a defendant's 
actual guilt" and is not probative; consequently, evidence that a defendant "knew 
a criminal" should have been excluded); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 
1317 (11th Cir. 1999) (excluding evidence that "tended to establish guilt by 
association-because [the defendants] cavorted with drug dealers, they must be 
drug dealers themselves"); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 
1983) (reasoning that prosecutor's questioning about defendant's association with 
a drug dealer created an inference that 11because [the defendant] maintained a 
relationship with a convicted cocaine dealer, [the defendant] himself was 
somehow prone to criminal activity of the same sort"). 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Challenged Testimony inferred guilt by association and was highly 
prejudicial. 'The critical question in a rule 403 analysis for unfair prejudice is 
whether certain[] testimony is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly 
weigh the evidence." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ,r 30, 345 P.3d 1195 (quotations 
omitted). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it encourages "the jury to find guilt 
from improper reasoning," id. (quotations omitted), such as finding a defendant 
guilty merely because of an association with others, State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, 
,r 37, 345 P.3d 1168. 
Here, the Challenged Testimony encouraged the jury to find Mr. Edgar 
guilty because he knew drug dealers. An attorney in trial counsel's position should 
have realized that evidence linking a defendant charged with a drug crime to drug 
dealers-when there is no evidence that the drug dealers were involved in the 
charged crimes- is unfairly prejudicial. See United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 
F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding testimony that implicitly associated the 
defendant with a drug cartel was prejudicial, especially when an association with 
the cartel did not bear on any element of the charged crime); see generally United 
States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 
246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that the testimony that portrayed the 
defendant "as a member of an enormous international drug trafficking 
organization and implied that he knew of the drugs in his car because of his role 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in that organization" was prejudicial because the defendant "was not alleged to be 
associated with a drug trafficking organization in even the most minor way"). 
The Challenged Testimony was both minimally probative and unduly 
prejudicial; Mr. Edgar's attorney should have realized that the testimony should 
have been excluded under Rule 403 and therefore was deficient for not objecting 
to the testimony. 
Mr. Edgar was prejudiced. Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure 
to object to the Challenged Testimony. 
The evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong. The police found drugs in 
Mr. Edgar's wife's vehicle after the vehicle left Mr. Edgar's home. But Mr. Edgar 
was not in the vehicle when the police found the drugs, and no officer saw Mr. 
Edgar get in the vehicle, even though the officers were surveilling Mr. Edgar's 
home. (R. 451-52, 546-57, 526.) 
The police did find drugs on the passenger in the vehicle, Ms. Marsh. (R. 
456-58.) It was Ms. Marsh- who was originally Mr. Edgar's co-defendant and who 
had drugs and drug paraphernalia on her the night Mr. Edgar was arrested-who 
said that the safe of drugs was Mr. Edgar's. (R. 565.) Ms. Marsh also testified at 
trial that she could not exactly remember parts of what happened the night Mr. 
Edgar was arrested because she had" done quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.) 
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~ 
Because the evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong, the Challenged 
Testimony-the evidence that Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers-allowed the jury to 
look beyond the facts presented and make the impermissible inference that Mr. 
Edgar possessed the drugs found in the vehicle because he knew drug dealers. The 
inference to be drawn from the evidence of Mr. Edgar's knowledge of the identity 
of drug dealers may have led the jury to conclude that Mr. Edgar should be 
punished "regardless of his liability in this particular case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69, 
~ 37. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's counsel was deficient for not objecting to the 
Challenged Testimony under Rule 403, and Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his 
counsel's failure to object. 
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1.2 Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's misstatements in closing argument. 
Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's statements during closing arguments that misstated the evidence and 
that were inflammatory. 
During the trial, the State introduced evidence that Mr. Edgar made 
statements that he knew drug dealers. (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593.) Specifically, 
a DEA agent testified that Mr. Edgar said "that he had access to a Mexican source 
of supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that he was capable of 
getting pounds from that, from that target." (Add. C., R. 593.) But the State 
presented no evidence of any statement by Mr. Edgar where he admitted to 
possessing the drugs found in his wife's car. 
In the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, he told the jury: 
Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges 
with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, how many 
of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and 
say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work, 
I'm moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin. Who else 
mentioned heroin? Mr. Stewart said no one else 
mentioned heroin. Heather Marsh mentioned heroin. 
What does the defendant keep in his safe? Meth, heroin, 
pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam. 
(Add. D., R. 672-73 (emphasis added).) Mr. Edgar's trial counsel did not object to 
the prosecutor's statement, and the district court never issued any type of curative 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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instruction. (Add. D, R. 673-75.) The statement came at the end of the prosecutor's 
rebuttal, and shortly thereafter the jury was released for deliberations. (Add. D, R. 
675.) 
In a prosecutorial misconduct claim brought in the ineffective assistance of 
counsel context, a court examines (1) whether the prosecutor's statements are 
"° improper, (2) whether trial counsel performed unreasonably by not objecting to 
the comments, and (3) whether the deficient conduct was prejudicial. State v. 
Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ,r 45, 318 P.3d 1221. 
The prosecutor's statement in closing was improper. "Prosecutors are held to a 
high standard regarding their conduct, given the possibility that the jury will give 
special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige 
associated with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the fact-finding 
facilities presumably available to the office." Id. ,r 43 ( quotations omitted). "In 
closing arguments, a prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences based upon the 
~ demeanor of the witness. However, counsel is precluded from arguing matters not 
in evidence." Id. ,r 63 (quotations and citation omitted). "[W]hen a prosecutor 
insinuates that other evidence exists he encourages the jury to determine its verdict 
based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's right to a 
trial based upon the evidence presented." Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 23 (quotation 
omitted). 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Here, the prosecutor made two statements that were not supported by the 
evidence in the record: (1) the statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer 
admittedly" and (2) the statement that Mr. Edgar was "moving tons of weight, 
pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672.) 
First, the statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer admittedly" finds no 
support in the record. (Id.) No testimony existed of Mr. Edgar admitting or 
confessing that the drugs found in vehicle were his. There was quite a bit of 
testimony about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593), 
and Ms. Marsh even testified that Mr. Edgar kept the drugs in the safe "for 
selling," (R. 566) but there was no evidence of Mr. Edgar stating that the drugs 
were his. The prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer 
admittedly" simply was not true. 
Second, the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was "moving tons of 
weight, pounds of heroin" was not supported by evidence in the record. (Add. D., 
R. 672.) What was in the record was Mr. Edgar's statement to the agent that he had 
access to someone who could supply pounds of heroin, not that Mr. Edgar himself 
was moving pounds of heroin. (Compare Add. C., R. 593 with Add. D, R. 672.) The 
difference between access to an individual with pounds of heroin and moving 
pounds of heroin is significant. The latter casts Mr. Edgar as a serious drug dealer. 
The jump from access to a heroin supplier to being the heroin supplier is a 
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misstatement of the evidence and is too far of a leap to be considered a reasonable 
inference drawn from the evidence. See generally United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 
777, 784-85 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that prosecutor committed misconduct when 
he misstated the testimony of a witness during closing arguments); United States 
v. White, 222 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that prosecutor engaged in 
I,@ misconduct when he referenced facts in the closing argument that were not in 
evidence). 
Not only was the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was moving 
"pounds of heroin" not supported by the evidence, it was also inflammatory. The 
State charged Mr. Edgar with possession of drugs with intent to distribute; a 
statement that Mr. Edgar distributed "pounds of heroin" cast Mr. Edgar as a high-
level drug dealer and encouraged the jury to punish Mr. Edgar regardless of his 
conduct in this case. See generally Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 25 ("Within the context of 
a criminal trial for the sexual abuse of a child, it is difficult to conceive of a more 
inflammatory statement than that offered by the prosecutor-namely, that 
Defendant had a prior history of child sex abuse.") 
In sum, the prosecutor's statement was improper because it misstated the 
evidence and was inflammatory. 
Trial counsel performed unreasonably by not objecting to the comments. Because 
there was no evidence that Mr. Edgar admitted to being a drug dealer and there 
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was no evidence that Mr. Edgar was moving "pounds of heroin," Mr. Edgar's trial 
counsel should have been immediately aware that the prosecutor's statement was 
both improper and inflammatory. Because the statement was improper and 
inflammatory, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel should have immediately objected, moved 
for a mistrial, or asked for a curative instruction. See id. ,r 26 (reasoning that 
because of the prosecutor's "obviously improper and inflammatory comments, 
defense counsel should have immediately objected and moved for a mistrial or, at 
the very least, demanded a curative instruction"). But trial counsel did nothing. 
And soon after the prosecutor made the statement, the jury was dismissed to 
deliberate without any further instructions from the district court. 
Sound trial strategy may include remaining silent so as to not emphasize the 
prejudicial nature of the statement to the jury. But see id. ,r 31 ("[T]he 'fear of 
highlighting' argument should be analyzed with some skepticism. For at bottom, 
when accepted, it permits the State to engage in improper conduct without 
consequence."). 
Yet in this case, remaining silent was not sound trial strategy. See id. ,r 26-
27. The statement was obviously improper and highly prejudicial to Mr. Edgar. 
Mr. Edgar was on trial for possessing drugs with intent to distribute, so a comment 
about Mr. Edgar distributing "pounds of heroin" does "not pass by unnoticed, 
particularly within the context of a criminal trial for that very crime." Id. ,r 29. "An 
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objection simply would not have highlighted the [statement] any more 
significantly than it already was." Id. In fact, it was" unreasonable for counsel to fear 
highlighting [the statement] by objecting because [it was] already brightly 
highlighted by [its] very nature." Id. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel 
performed deficiently by not objecting to the prosecutor's statement in closing 
~ argument. 
Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by the deficient conduct. "In determining whether a 
defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, [a court] consider[s] 
the case as a whole, including evidence of Defendant's guilt." State v. Todd, 2007 
UT App 349, , 35, 173 P.3d 170. "[I]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Id. (quotations 
omitted). Yet "when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently 
conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper argument. In such 
instances, they are more susceptible to the suggestion that factors other than the 
vJ evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or innocence." Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
As argued above, in section 1.1 infra, the evidence against Mr. Edgar was 
not overwhelming. The police found drugs in Mr. Edgar's wife's vehicle after the 
vehicle left Mr. Edgar's home, but Mr. Edgar was not in the vehicle when the police 
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found the drugs, and no officer saw Mr. Edgar get in the vehicle, even though the 
officers were surveilling Mr. Edgar's home. (R. 451-52, 546-57, 526.) 
The police did find drugs and drug paraphernalia on the passenger in the 
vehicle, Ms. Marsh. (R. 456-58.) And Ms. Marsh testified that the safe of drugs was 
Mr. Edgar's. (R. 565.) But Ms. Marsh also testified at trial that she could not exactly 
remember parts of what happened the night Mr. Edgar was arrested because she 
had" done quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.) 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment came at the end of his rebuttal. Mr. 
Edgar's attorney had no chance to correct the comment (outside of making an 
objection, which he did not do), and the district court did not instruct the jury after 
the rebuttal ended to emphasize to the jury that the prosecutor's comments were 
not evidence. Instead, the jury was dismissed to deliberate. The improper 
comment, coming so close to the end of trial, tainted the jury deliberation process. 
In sum, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel should have realized that the prosecutor's 
statements about Mr. Edgar being a" drug dealer admittedly" and "moving tons 
of weight, pounds of heroin" misstated the evidence and did not constitute a 
reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. Furthermore, trial counsel should 
have objected to the statement because it was inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. 
Edgar. And finally, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object; the 
evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong, the prosecutor's statement came right 
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before the jury deliberation process, and the district court did not give any 
intervening jury instruction cautioning the jury that the attorneys' statements were 
not evidence. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to 
object to the prosecutor's misstatements in closing argument and Mr. Edgar was 
prejudiced thereby. 
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1.3 Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion arguing that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to exclude Mr. Edgar's 
comments made during the course of plea negotiations. 
Concurrent with this brief, Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion 
requesting remand. "Rule 23B motions are available only in limited circumstances, 
to supplement the record with known facts needed for an appellant to assert an 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal." State v. Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, 
,r 15, 317 P.3d 968 (quotation omitted). A Rule 23B motion must" (1) contain a 
nonspeculative allegation of facts that (2) do not fully appear in the record, which, 
if true, (3) could support a determination that counsel's performance was deficient, 
and (4) demonstrate that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result." Id. 
Additionally, Rule 23B motions must "be accompanied by affidavits ... that show 
the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient 
performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). In his Rule 23B motion, Mr. Edgar has 
requested remand to supplement the record on whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the detective's testimony about what Mr. Edgar 
said during plea negotiations. 
At trial, a detective testified about conversations he had with Mr. Edgar 
about cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for leniency on his charges. 
(Add. B, R. 511.) The detective testified that before he could make a deal with Mr. 
Edgar he had to talk to the prosecuting attorney. (Add. B, R. 511-12.) Eventually 
22 
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Mr. Edgar did provide the detective with some information. (Add. B, R. 512.) 
During an exchange with the detective, Mr. Edgar "indicated that he knew 
several- and his words were big players of people that carry weight which would 
mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely 
methamphetamine is what we were speaking about, that he could provide those 
~ people in exchange for leniency on these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.) 
Although the record contains the detective's testimony about negotiations 
with Mr. Edgar, it does not contain any information about Mr. Edgar's views of 
those negotiations. 
Attached to the Rule 23B motion and this brief is Mr. Edgar's affidavit. In 
that affidavit, Mr. Edgar testifies that the detective was one of his arresting officers 
for the charged crimes in this case. (Add. E, Edgar Aff. if 4.) Mr. Edgar testifies that 
while he was in jail, after he was charged, the detective came to talk with him and 
asked him if he knew of any other drug dealers in the area. (Id. if 5.) The detective 
~ said that the more information that Mr. Edgar could give him, the better deal he 
would get. (Id.) Furthermore, the detective told him that if Mr. Edgar gave him 
information, the detective would reduce the charges against Mr. Edgar or reduce 
his sentence. (Id.) 
Mr. Edgar further testifies that after he bonded out of jail, the detective 
viJ 
asked him if he could be a confidential informant. (Id. if 8.) But before Mr. Edgar 
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could sign all the papers so that he could officially be a confidential informant, the 
detective asked Mr. Edgar to meet him at a certain location at a certain time in the 
evening. (Id. ,r 10.) During that meeting, the detective asked him questions about 
several people and asked him to do a controlled buy. (Id.) Mr. Edgar believed that 
while he was giving the detective this information, the detective would reduce his 
charges or that he would not do prison time; Mr. Edgar testified that he gave the 
detective that information because he believed that by doing so his charges would 
be reduced. (Id ,r,r 11-12.) 
Utah R. Evid. 410 prohibits the use of "a statement made during plea 
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did 
not result in a guilty plea." "This rule can be fairly read to apply to statements 
made to a government attorney during the course of plea discussions or to an 
agent whom the government attorney has authorized to engage in plea 
discussions," including a law enforcement officer. United States v. O'Neal, 992 F.2d 
1218, at *8 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished).4 Consequently, "a government agent's 
representation that he had the authority to negotiate a plea bargain might be 
sufficient to bring any consequent statements by a criminal defendant within the 
4 Mr. Edgar references federal law here because Utah's Rule 401 is "the 
federal rule, verbatim." Utah R. Evid. 401 advisory comm. note. 
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excludability provisions of the rules." United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 799 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
Courts apply a two-tiered test to determine whether a statement was made 
in the course of plea negotiations. W. Valley CihJ v. Fieeiki, 2007 UT App 62, ,r 23, 
157 P.3d 802. First, the court must determine "whether the accused exhibited an 
J actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion." Id. 
(quotation omitted). Second, the court must determine "whether the accused's 
expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
Here, Mr. Edgar's affidavit shows that he exhibited an actual subjective 
expectation to negotiate a plea at the time he made his comments to the detective. 
The conversations Mr. Edgar had with the detective occurred after the charges had 
been filed against Mr. Edgar, so a plea negotiation was a natural next step. (Add. 
E, Edgar Aff. ,r,r 2-5). He testified that the detective told him that the more 
information he gave the detective, the better deal Mr. Edgar would get. (Id. ,r 5.) 
Mr. Edgar also testified that the detective told him that if Mr. Edgar gave him 
information, the detective would reduce Mr. Edgar's charges or reduce his 
sentence. (Id.) 
Moreover, Mr. Edgar's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the 
circumstances. Although the detective testified that he could not negotiate with 
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Mr. Edgar before talking with the prosecutor, Mr. Edgar testified that over the 
course of several months the detective spoke with Mr. Edgar about giving him 
information about drug dealers and informed Mr. Edgar that his cooperation 
would result in lower charges or reduced sentence. (Id. 115-12.) Given this, Mr. 
Edgar's expectation that he was negotiating his plea by cooperating with the police 
was reasonable. 
For these reasons, the comments Mr. Edgar made to the detective should be 
excluded under Rule 410. Given the information that is not on the record, Mr. 
Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to exclude the detective's comments. 
And as argued in sections 1.1 and 1.2, supra, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced because the 
evidence against him was not strong, and evidence about his knowledge of drug 
dealers suggested to the jury to convict Mr. Edgar because of his association with 
drug dealers rather than the facts in evidence. 
Conclusion 
This Court should vacate Mr. Edgar's convictions because his trial counsel 
was ineffective. First, his trial counsel did not object to testimony about Mr. 
Edgar's knowledge of the identity of drug dealers; that testimony was minimally 
probative and unduly prejudicial. Second, his trial counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor's statement in closing argument that misstated the evidence and that 
was inflammatory. Finally, Mr. Edgar has filed a Rule 23B motion alleging that his 
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"" trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of Mr. Edgar's 
comments made during the course of plea negotiations. 
For all these reasons, Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his convictions. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2015. 
Emily Adams (14937) 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
P.O. Box 1564 
Bountiful, UT 84011 
eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
(801) 309-9625 
Attoniey for Defendant/Appellant 
Michael Edgar 
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Addendum A 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. Edgar, District Court Case No. 
131403487, on June 24, 2015 (R. 354-56.) 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant. 
custody: Utah County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: treenah 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 131403487 FS 
Judge: LYNN W DAVIS 
Date: June 24, 2015 
FILED g~=t 
STATE OF UTAH 
lJTAHCOUNry 
V$) Defendant's Attorney(s): STEWART, GREGORY V 
\JU 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 16, 1980 
Audio 
Tape Number: 301-15 Tape Count: 11:36 
CHARGES 
1. 
2. 
POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty 
POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty 
3. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended} - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty 
4. 
s. 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty 
USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (amended} - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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Case No: 131403487 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentence to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends Defendant not serve a lengthy sentence. Court recommends defendant be 
given credit for time served of 257 days, the court also recommends defendant 
participate in the Conquest Program. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time (.v 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class 
B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 180 day(s) previously served. ~ 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge# 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 2 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 3 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $1000.00 
Charge# 4 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $1000.00 
Charge# 5 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $1000.00 
Total Fine: $23000.00 
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Case No: 131403487 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
Total Suspended: $23000.00 
-..;; Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail. 
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Addendum B 
Transcript of relevant portions of arresting detective's testimony 
(R. 511-14) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 drugs were his, they weren't hers at all. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. 
Meaning Arja. 
Yeah. Okay. And what offers did he further make 
regarding any cooperation? 
A Again, in that interview he continued to talk about 
7 that he would provide cooperation or he would give us big 
8 
9 
people, he had involvement or had ties to people that he 
could offer up to us in exchange for leniency on these 
10 charges. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q How soon could he provide that information to you? 
A He wanted to get out of jail right then and there. 
He wanted us to walk him out and go do it right then. 
Q Okay. Okay. Did you talk to him about signing him 
up as a confidential informant at that time? 
A We did; however, at that point it was, we were well 
17 within the - we needed to speak with the attorney that was 
18 
19 
assigned to it before we tried to do anything. We can't just 
take someone out of jail on a whim. There's processes to go 
20 through at that point. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay, and you, and you told the defendant about 
Correct. 
And so how were things left with him? 
Things were left with him as we would need to speak 
128 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
with the prosecuting attorney at that time to see what he'd 
be willing to do, if he would be willing to allow him to work 
in exchange for leniency. 
Q Okay. All right. In speaking with the defendant 
did he ever refer to Arja as anything other than his wife? 
A Not to my recollection ever. 
Q Okay. Did he ever deny knowledge of the safe or 
its contents? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever give the defendant your cell phone 
11 number? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A I did. 
Q Okay. Did he ever contact you after this November 
25:r. interview at the jail to talk about working again? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Okay, when's the first time that you recall? 
Time frame is going to be -
Weeks, months? 
- weeks at least. He called and attempted to 
20 provide information to work. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Okay, and was that something you were interested in 
following up on? 
Not really, no. 
How many times did he call you after that? 
A 
Q 
A I'd have to say multiple times over the course of 
129 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
that and to early the next spring or summer, probably 15 or 
20 times is a good guess. 
Q Okay. 
A We attempted to try to work but he couldn't provide 
what he was saying he could. 
Q And when you say that with respect to the charges 
7 in this case, what was he saying he could provide that didn't 
8 1 end up panning out? 
9 THE COURT: Approach again if you will, counsel, 
10 just for about 30 seconds. 
11 (Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
12 
13 
THE COURT: - somewhere (inaudible) my ruling 
(inaudible). You may have to - just very briefly in terms of 
14 (inaudible) that leads as to these charges 'cause even though 
15 your questions are accurate and focused -
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 16 
17 THE COURT: - he may open up and say something else 
18 that will be improper. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 (End of sidebar) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Detective, with respect to these 
charges, you said the defendant contacted you at least, 
approximately 15 times over the next several months, you said 
until spring or summer of 2014? 
130 
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1 
2 
3 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And what sort of things did he offer you 
that he could provide in exchange for leniency on these 
4 charges? 
5 A Ummm, he indicated that he knew several - and his 
6 1 words were big players of people that carry weight which 
7 would mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal 
8 
1 
drugs, namely methamphetamine is what we were speaking about, 
9 that he could provide those people in exchange for leniency 
10 
11 
12 
13 
on these charges. 
Q Okay, and when you say provide these people, just 
give you a name and address or what? 
A Provide - without going into detail about those 
14 things it would be just provide information that would lead 
15 us to probable cause for an arrest in dealing with the other 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
person. 
Q Did he actually give you names during these 
conversations? 
A Yes, there were several names. 
Q Were these names significant to you, that you felt 
were worth looking into? 
A No, sir. 
Q Okay. Did you actually ever go to a location to 
24 conduct an operation involving the defendant that did not pan 
25 out? 
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AddendumC 
Transcript of relevant portions of DEA agent's testimony (R. 593) 
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1 would be willing to work with him, if he's actually worth my 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
time in fact. 
Q Describe that conversation to the jury. 
A So I asked him what level of cooperation he'd be 
able to provide me, what types of drug traffickers and what 
quantities of drugs he was capable of obtaining. He informed 
7 me that he could, that he had access to a Mexican source of 
8 supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that 
9 he was capable of getting pounds from that, from that target. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q Did that interest you? 
A It did interest me. Ummm, obviously a pound level 
heroin dealer is worth the DEA's time in Utah and it was 
something that we were willing to pursue at that point. 
Q So did you talk to him about the parameters of what 
would be expected of him if you were to accept his offer? 
A We did preliminarily discuss some of the 
17 requirements of a confidential source, didn't go into great 
18 detail with it because there were some other things that I 
19 needed to resolve before I wanted to go further into that. 
20 It's kind of one of those things that you don't want to 
21 overstep your bounds -
22 MR. JOHNSON: Sorry, if we could have just a sec, 
23 worry, Judge, I just - it's hard to hear. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Thank you, Officer Raez. 
MR. JOHNSON: Appreciate that. 
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1 
2 
conduct he used with Detective Palmer the day of the first 
phone call, from the first in-person meeting, from four days 
3 later at the jail when he's still offering up to work. 
4 Imagine his surprise, you know, seven months later to get a 
5 call from DEA agents saying Mr. Edgar wants to work with us 
6 now, he's not satisfied with what you did. Well, his 
7 comments were, yeah, we didn't work with him. So again, 
8 
9 
information that's unique to Mr. Edgar was transmitted to 
this DEA agent whose here just to tell you about this 
10 conversation. He didn't have a prior relationship with him 
11 or me, goes to his credibility. 
12 1 
13 
14 
15 
16 
You know, Mr. Stewart didn't mention it much in his 
closing but during his cross examination of the Crime Lab, 
Amberlee Neibaur, he's asking her about prescription 
methamphetamine, isn't there such a thing as prescription 
methamphetamine? Sure, it's possible. Is that a doubt? 
17 Okay, that's a doubt. There's such a thing as prescription 
18 
19 
methamphetamine. Is that a reasonable doubt? No, it's not a 
reasonable doubt. Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to 
20 work off charges with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, 
21 how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and 
22 
23 
say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work, I'm 
moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin. Who else mentioned 
24 heroin? Mr. Stewart said no one else mentioned heroin. 
25 1 Heather Marsh mentioned heroin. What does the defendant keep 
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1 
2 
in his safe? Meth, heroin, pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam. 
Just because heroin and Clonazepam weren't in the safe, does 
3 that mean it's not his safe all of a sudden? No. Ultimately 
4 
5 
ladies and gentlemen, you're looking at the evidence that's 
before you that has to be reasonable and the reasonable 
6 explanation is that he's a drug dealer and you'll get two 
7 
8 
9 
carts worth of evidence. I mean, is this all just a bad day 
for Mr. Edgar, someone is using his name, called the DEA? 
Someone has a safe of his that they've put all their stuff 
10 in? That's not reasonable. 
11 When you focus on the possession with intent to 
12 distribute in a drug free zone, that's a lot of verbiage, a 
13 lot of clauses, a lot of phrases when you all run it 
14 altogether. What you need to look at is it doesn't mean that 
15 he had to intend to distribute those items at that 7-Eleven. 
16 That's not what we're here to say. We're saying he possessed 
17 them by that 7-Eleven and why did he possess them? Well, we 
18 talked about this, this isn't his personal use, isn't his 
19 personal stash, he possesses them because he's a drug dealer. 
20 He's possessing with intent to distribute. Where is he 
21 possessing them? Well, it's within 1000 feet of Lindon 
22 Elementary School, that's what makes it a drug free zone. So 
23 don't get hung up on, oh, we have to show that he had to 
24 
25 
possess them, distribute them right there within the drug 
free zone. He could have wanted to distribute them that 
000673 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
night, the next day, as long as he possessed them within that 
area with the intent to distribute them at some point, that's 
enough. 
When you look at the evidence, reasons why the 
defendant possessed the safe because Mr. Stewart talked 
6 about, Oh, it was never fingerprinted. Oh, we should have had 
7 some more proof that way. You've also got Heather's 
8 
1 
testimony about he had access to it, how he had it from the 
9 couch, how he packed it, how he transported it into the car, 
10 the whole combination thing. Who had access to this? Why 
11 are the police monkeying around with him if they've got Arja 
12: and Heather who are giving up information left and right? 
13 Heather is saying, Oh, yeah, I've got it in my bra, but all 
14 of a sudden she's going to say, oh, but I'm not going to give 
15 you the combination for that safe but by the way there's a 
16 safe in the trunk. Or is more likely that she's telling the 
17 truth and saying, Hey, I had no combination to it, Arja had 
18 no combination to it. That's why the police were talking to 
19 
20 
Mr. Edgar. Why would he have the combination to it unless he 
owned it? And why would that be corroborated by the fact 
21 that he tells the police, I'll give you the combination but 
22 it might implicate me so I'm not going to do that. Well, you 
23 know, frankly saying that implicates you. So that didn't 
24 
25 
really work out. 
Again, his pill bottle was inside and just 
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1 painfully over and over again he asked police not to open it. 
Why would you care if you don't know what's inside? 2 
3 Then under reasons why he possessed with intent to 
4 distribute, again, half an ounce of meth, 28 pills of 
5 oxycontin, you know, if someone else is walking down the 
6 street and they have a pill bottle in their pocket, 20 
7 oxycontin, and that's all they have, private personal use, 
8 
9 
private prescription, I agree. But when you look at it in 
totality of everything we have here, why is he possessing 
10 these things? To distribute them. 
11 In the end ladies and gentlemen, he had a mobile 
12 pharmacy. You heard testimony about - a mobile pharmacy but 
13 he is not a pharmacist. He is a drug dealer. He told 
14 Detective Palmer that, he told Agent Holmer that and his 
15 actions and statements and the totality of the evidence back 
that up and I ask that you find him guilty on all counts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 
16 
17 
18 
19 Let's have the deputy then sworn please. If you'll 
20 stand and raise your right hand. 
21 
22 
(Whereupon the bailiff was sworn) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, now is the time 
23 for your deliberations. We will deliver to you all of the 
24 exhibits. Here's the original jury verdict form. 
25 Officer, please, if you'll take that and place that 
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EMILY M. R. ADAMS (14937) 
~ Adams Legal LLC 
1310 Madera Hills Dr. 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Telephone: (801) 309-9625 
~ Email: eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL EDGAR, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
) 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL 
EDGAR 
App. No. 20150594-CA 
I, Michael Edgar, first duly sworn and upon oath, a resident of this 
state and an individual over the age of 21, hereby state as follows: 
1. I was arrested.for drug-related offenses in November 2013. 
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2. I was charged with the drug-related charges in this case on 
November 28, 2013. 
3. I remained in jail from November 2013 until late December 
2013, when I bonded out. 
4. For the offenses in this case, one of the arresting officers was 
named Detective Palmer. 
5. While I was in jail, Detective Palmer came to talk to me. He 
asked me if I knew of any other drug dealers in the area. He said I should 
contact him if I had any information. He said that the more information I 
would give him, the better deal I would get. He said that if I gave him 
information that he would reduce the charges against me or reduce my 
sentence. 
6. Detective Palmer also called me and asked if I had any 
information about specific drug dealers. 
7. I bonded out of jail at the end of December 2013. 
8. Sometime between January 2014 and March 2014, Detective 
Palmer told me that he wanted me to come into his office to sign some 
papers to be a confidential informant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. One night during that time, Detective Palmer asked me to meet 
him at a certain location, and he said that we would sign the confidential 
informant papers later. 
10. I arrived at the location and found Detective Palmer. He asked 
me questions about a bunch of people. He also asked me to set up a phone 
call to do a controlled buy for a very small amount of drugs. He also had 
me identify a house out of which people were dealing drugs. I met with the 
detective for about two hours. 
11. During this time, Detective Palmer told me that if I were a 
confidential informant and gave him information, my charges would be 
reduced and that I wouldn't do any prison time related to the crimes 
charged in this case. 
12. I gave the detective the information he asked about because I 
believed that by doing so he would reduce my charges or my sentence. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 1 day of December 2015. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SANPETE 
VERIFICATION 
) 
) 
On this r~._r-, day of December 2015 personally appeared before me 
Michael Edgar who duly acknowledge to me that she prepared the 
following Affidavit and knows the contents thereof to be correct. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r .- i··j day of December 
2015. 
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